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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to analyse the impact 
of audit quality on firm performance of listed companies in 
Botswana, and Uganda. As a monitoring mechanism, the role 
of auditing is to reduce information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders, thereby bolstering investor 
confidence which consequently improves firm value. 
Design/methodology/approach: The study sampled 
domestically listed financial and non-financial companies on 
the stock exchanges of Botswana and Uganda for the five years 
2014-2018.Using auditor size and audit fees as proxies for 
audit quality and return on assets, and Tobin's Q as measures 
of firm performance, the relationship between the variables 
was determined through regression analysis. The study also 
controlled for complexity, risk and growth of the companies.   
Findings: Results of the study show that audit quality is a 
negative but non-significant predictor of firm performance for 
financial performance.  
Originality/value: The findings of the study provide 
empirical evidence into the effectiveness of auditing as a 
corporate governance mechanism in the Sub-Saharan capital 
markets.   
DOI: 10.32602/jafas.2020.029 
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1. Introduction 
Auditing has its roots in the private sector where there is a concern of fraud through theft 
and misappropriation of assets. The importance of auditing lies in its perceived role in 
detecting fraud, errors and irregularities in financial statements. Auditing bolsters 
confidence and creditability of the financial statements which is needed for improving 
performance as users rely on them to make investment decisions. The audit of financial 
statements is an essential tool in maintaining an efficient market environment by reducing 
information asymmetries. Fraudulent behaviour occurs significant problems of agency arise 
resulting from a weak governance system. Thus, fraudulent financial statements can be seen 
as a problem of information asymmetry (Magnanelli, Nasta, and Pirolo, 2017). Xin, Zhou, and 
Hu (2018) found that companies that engaged in fraud experienced performance 
deterioration. In a study of high-profile corporate failures, Soltani (2014) found that a lack of 
audit quality is one of the reasons for financial and corporate scandals. The findings of the 
study are supported by other studies (Umar, Erlina, and Fauziah, 2019; Magnanelli et. al, 
2017). The recent scandals of corporate failures such as Patisserie Valerie in the UK (2018), 
Steinhoff and KPMG in South Africa (2018), Kingdom Bank Africa Limited and Choppies 
Limited in Botswana (2015, 2018 respectively); Crane Bank in Uganda (2018) demonstrates 
the need of increased scrutiny of financial statements. 
In all the cases mentioned above, evidence of fraud occurred despite unqualified audit 
opinion expressed of the financial statements by auditors. Due to these and past corporate 
failures such as Enron, WorldCom and Tesco, there has been an increased focus on studies on 
audit quality. Following this path of research, this study analysed the effect of audit quality 
on the financial performance of listed companies from two developing countries, Botswana, 
and Uganda. This study will address an empirical gap of capital markets of sub-Saharan 
Africa. The world bank has recognised the need for the development of domestic capital 
markets in addressing developmental challenges and hence has brought to the fore, issues of 
investor protection. Therefore, this study also addresses the need for reform in 
strengthening investor protection and the regulatory framework for public offerings in the 
African capital markets. Audit quality and financial performance are at the core of these 
issues as audited financial statements are a tool for ensuring the safeguarding of 
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shareholder's investment. The following two specific objectives are addressed: a. The impact 
of auditor size on audit quality and; b. The impact of audit fees on audit quality. The next 
section of this study is a literature review developing our hypothesis that addressed the main 
aim of this paper, followed by a methodology section explaining the variables that were 
analysed. The final two sections are the discussion of the results and the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review And Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
In this study, the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) was applied as a theoretical 
framework. Agency theory encapsulates the problem of owner versus agent and has been 
used extensively in the finance and accounting literature. Specifically, it has been used to 
explain the relationship between external auditor performance and function (Adams, 1994). 
The theory postulates that problems arise when interests are misaligned and where 
informational asymmetry exists between the agent and the owner. The main contention is 
that agents will make potentially prejudicial and onerous decisions to shareholders in order 
to benefit themselves. This type of opportunistic behaviour can lead to poor financial 
performance. The information asymmetry that exists between principal and agent requires a 
redress in order to improve information about company performance. External audits act as 
a monitoring tool that reduces information asymmetry. Therefore, the greater the 
information asymmetry, the higher the demand for higher quality audits and vice versa 
(Farouk and Hassan, 2014; Gunn, Hallman, Li and Pittman, 2017). 
The agency theory was especially useful for this study as both Botswana and Uganda follow 
the Anglo-American corporate governance model where corporate governance is based on 
the agency relationship (Fooladi and Shukor, 2012). Corporate governance mechanisms such 
as audit quality aim to align the interests of agents with shareholders, thereby increasing 
firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Given the lack of infrastructural development 
in the capital markets of developing countries such as those in Africa (Capkun, Collins and 
Jeanjean, 2015), it is essential to assess how auditing affects firm performance. For example, 
developing countries tend to have weak enforcement of laws leading to inadequate investor 
protection and concentrated ownership (Roussow, 2005; Berglof and Von Thadden, 1999). 
Thus, investors have to seek assurance on the reliability of the financial statements 
elsewhere. The issues above demonstrate the importance of auditing as a corporate 
governance mechanism in minimising the agent shareholder conflict thereby giving 
assurance that firm value will be increased (Tahinakis and Samarinas, 2016; Popović, 
Tošković, Majstorović, Brkanlić and Katić, 2015; Franca and Corina, 2014; Türkân Uğur Dâi, 
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2014). 
2.2 Audit Quality 
Different stakeholders define audit quality in different ways based on their utility. For 
example, users of financial statements deem high-quality audit to be one that precludes 
significant inaccuracies in the financial statement. On the other hand, society and the audit 
firm may deem a high-quality audit as one where the firm can successfully withstand 
litigation.  According to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), there is no agreed-upon 
definition of audit quality that can be used as a standard against which performance can be 
assessed (FRC, 2006). In reiteration, the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(IOSO, 2009) reported that due to differences in stakeholder perceptions, it is challenging to 
define audit quality. Because of this difficulty, academicians and regulators have sought to 
determine audit quality with a composite framework. There are broad areas identified that 
overlap between regulator and academic audit quality frameworks (Francis, 2011; IAASB, 
2013; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik and Velury, 2013; FRC, 2008). Hu (2015) put 
forth a framework that combines the regulator and academic viewpoints. The article 
identified three key drivers of audit quality, including input, output and context of the audit 
and suggested measurements.  This study will pursue only a few of the measurements from 
the framework. Justification for selection of the measurements is made hereunder. 
We began with a discussion of ex-post audit quality measurements which are components of 
the output drivers identified in Hu's Framework. The first issues are restatement and 
litigation measures. An earlier study by Palmrose (1988) of audit firms indicated that the 
number of litigations is an indicator of the quality of the firm. Also, in evaluating audit 
quality, the number of restatements occurring in the financial statements can be used as an 
indicator that the financial statements were not presented accurately in the first place. A 
comprehensive data set over a 35-year period in America revealed an average of 28 lawsuits 
per annum, indicating a 0.28% annual audit failure rate. It was also found that the number of 
successful lawsuits was less than 50% of the filed lawsuits (Palmore, 2000). Given the small 
number of audit failures, it is difficult to infer that measurement as a proxy for audit quality 
(Francis, 2004). Addressing the matter of financial statement restatements, Francis (2004) 
found that the restatements surveyed over five years of American listed firms were simple, 
straightforward, retrospective estimation adjustments that were, in some cases, initiated by 
the auditors. In the rest of the cases, the restatements did not lead to any business failure 
suggesting that restatements are inadequate as an indicator for audit failure. 
Having determined that audit quality inferred upon by audit failures are quite intermittent 
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incidences, in this study, we turn to other drivers for determining audit quality. Audit size is 
a measurement encompassing all three drivers of audit quality, and so it is selected on that 
basis. Furthermore, we opted to consider audit fees as a proxy encompassing the context 
driver. Having selected the proxies as mentioned above, all three areas of audit quality 
drivers are addressed in this study. 
The audit market has evolved into a dual market in which there a few large dominant firms 
and that are perceived to deliver high-quality audits due to reputational risk in case of audit 
failure. Inversely, there are smaller, less prominent audit firms whose audits are perceived as 
being of lesser quality (Sirois, Marmousez and Simunic, 2016; Knechel, Niemi and Zerni, 
2013). The lesser quality of the smaller firms lends credence to the use of Big4 as a 
determinant of audit quality as also suggested by empirical studies (for example, Krishnan, 
Ma and Yan, 2016). The big 4 measure is especially useful for this study due to its 
effectiveness as a corporate governance mechanism in countries characterised by a weak 
legal environment such as those of developing countries (Khlif and Samaha, 2016). The Big4 
measure for audit size is therefore adopted in this study. Regarding audit fees, they are 
measured following the standards published by the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, which states that fees for professional services are necessary to perform an audit or 
review including services rendered for the audit of the company's annual financial 
statements. 
2.3 Auditor Size and Firm Performance 
Antecedents regarding auditor size point to a positive relationship with firm performance. 
Specifically, big 4 audit companies tend to improve firm performance compared with non-big 
4 audit firms (Alzoubi, 2018; Garven and Taylor, 2015; Kouaib and Jarboui, 2014; Lin and 
Hwang, 2010; Vander Bauwhede, Willekens and Gaeremynck, 2003). The improved 
performance is because big 4 audit firms have more experience in auditing publicly listed 
companies, better quality human resources, and the ability to handle complex audits (Sayyar 
Basiruddin, Rasid and Elhabib, 2015; Francis and Yu, 2009;). In a study of Malaysian firms 
Jusoh, Ahmad and Omar, (2013), found that firms that were audited by big 4 audit firms had 
a positive and significant relationship with firm performance similar to studies by Farouk 
and Hassan (2014) of Nigerian firms; Bouaziz (2012) of Tunisian firms; Phan, Lai, Le and 
Tran (2020) of Hanoi stock exchange; Eshitemi and Omwenga (2017) of Nairobi parastatals; 
Mustafa and Muhammad (2018) of Nigerian listed oil and gas companies. However, some 
studies revealed a significantly negative relationship between auditor size and firm 
performance, such as Elewa and El-Hadded (2019) in a study of Egyptian companies; 
Aledwan, Yaseen and Alkubisi (2015) in Jordanian cement companies. Based on this 
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literature, the following is posited: 
H1= Auditor size is a significant determinant of firm performance 
2.4 Audit Fees and Firm Performance 
It is a consensus in the accounting literature that audit fees reflect efforts of auditors because 
the audit market is highly regulated, and the ability to earn rents is limited. In anticipation of 
more audit work, i.e. more extensive reviews and closer supervision of staff, audit firms 
charge a higher fee commensurate with the amount of work involved in the auditing process 
(Schelleman and Knechel, 2010; Krishnan, Sun, Wang and Yang, 2013). Therefore, audit fees 
are a signal to the market of the added credibility of the financial information, thereby 
increasing firm value. In this regard, there has been conflicting evidence. Eshlemen and Guo 
(2014) found that audit fees were indicative of more considerable efforts by the auditor. 
Similar findings by other authors such as Blankley, Hurtt and MacGregor (2013) and Asthana 
and Boon (2012) supported this. However, dissent exists where audit fees did not indicate 
more considerable auditing efforts (Lin, Lin and Chen, 2018; Krauß, Pronobis and Zülch, 
2015; Choi, Kim and Zang, 2010) Donatella, Haraldsson and Tagesson (2019). These studies 
are consistent with a similar branch of literature that suggests that audit fees create an 
economic bond, a determinant of audit behaviour (Laitinen and Laitinen, 2018; Hoitash, 
Markelevich and Barragato, 2007). When this economic bond exists between auditors and 
client audit, fees are expected to have an inverse relationship with firm performance. Such is 
the case with studies by Mustafa and Muhammad, 2018; Sulong et al., 2013; Moutinho, 
Cerqueira and Brandao, 2012. However, Laitinen and Laitinen (2018) pointed out that the 
auditor-client economic bond was prevalent among non-Big 4 auditing firms, suggesting that 
protecting their reputations outweighed the value of any additional fees to be gained. In that 
regard, audit fees are expected to positively correlate with firms' performance, such as 
Sayyar et al. (2015). 
Thus, the second hypothesis is:  
H2= Audit fees are a significant determinant of firm performance 
3. Research methods 
3.1 Sample selection 
The basis for selection of the Botswana and Uganda for this study was first, their legacy of 
colonial inheritance. Both countries were former British colonies and were two of thirteen 
countries that developed a corporate governance code that borrows heavily from the British 
Anglo-American System. Thus, Botswana's and Uganda's corporate governance code is chiefly 
concerned with the principal-agent relationship and the associated rules and laws that 
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regulate that relationship. The second basis for selection is in the comparison of the two 
countries as developmental states. Mbabazi and Taylor (2005) argue that developmental 
states are not defined by their economic performance but rather by their ideological 
underpinnings of development and whose resources are directed towards economic 
development. Botswana and Uganda are both considered prosperous countries in their own 
right, albeit with different outcomes. Both countries remain Ricardian economies, having 
achieved rapid post-colonial growth with no structural transformations of their economies. 
This success is attributable to developmental institutions whose purpose it was to foster tri-
lateral partnerships amongst civil society, private companies and the state. This trio, 
constitutes prevailing contemporary governance of the countries, linking with the 
fundamental basis of selection. Botswana and Uganda are examples of two developmental 
African countries whose institutions (including financial) have led to growth. In summary, the 
selection of Botswana and Uganda as subjects of this study was justified and further 
supported by other studies (Sekitoleko, 2017; Ganamotse, Samuelsson, Abankwah, Anthony 
and Mphela, 2017; Onessimo, 2016; Kiiza, 2006; Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005) 
Data was gathered from the financial statements of domestically listed companies from 
the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE) and the Uganda Stock Exchange (USE) for the five 
years 2014-2018. The BSE had 26 listed companies by the end of December 2019, and 
Uganda had nine listed companies by the end of December 2019. Selection of company 
financial statements was based on two factors, firstly, that the company is registered 
during the five years under study and secondly, that the data is available for the 
companies. The final data set consisted of data from twenty-four companies, seventeen 
from Botswana and seven from Uganda. Table 1 depicts the demographics of the 
companies in the sample. 
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Table 1: Demographic data 
 Frequency Percentage (%) 
Sector   
Construction 1 4.17 
Consumer goods 1 4.17 
Consumer services 3 12.50 
Energy 1 4.17 
Financial 15 62.50 
Industrial 1 4.17 
Media 1 4.17 
Oil and gas 1 4.17 
 
3.2 Model Specifications 
The model constructed was to determine the impact of audit quality on firm performance. 
As earlier alluded, audit quality was measured using auditor size and audit fees as proxies. 
Financial performance was measured using the return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q. 
These represented non-market and market measures of performance. ROA measures firm 
profitability as a proportion of net income to total firm assets, whereas TQ measures firm 
value as a proportion of market capitalisation of a firm to total firm assets. Additionally, 
the model uses four control variables, firm size, leverage and the book to market ratio. 
Table 2 below gives a summary of the variables and their measurement. 
Table 2. Summary of Variables 
Variable Measurement 
Independent Variable (Audit Quality)  
 Auditor Size (BIG4) 
 
 Audit Fees (AuditFee) 
 
 
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4, and 0 otherwise 
 
The natural log of audit fees. (The sum of all audit fees 
paid to the auditor) 
 
Dependent Variables (Financial 
Performance) 
 Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
 Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) 
 
 
 
Net Income/Total Assets 
 
Market Capitalisation/ Total Assets 
Control Variables 
 Firm size (LTA) 
 
 Leverage (LEV) 
 
 Book to Market Ratio (BTM) 
 
 
Natural log of total assets (complexity control variable)  
 
Total Debt/Total Assets (risk control variable) 
 
Market capitalisation/Netbook value (growth control 
variable) 
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For this study, two models are used as below indicating the two dependent variables for 
measures of firm performance.  
Model I 
ROA= β0 +1+AuditFee + β2Big4 + β3LTA + β4LEV + β5BTM +ɛt………………(I) 
Model II 
Q = β0 +1+AuditFee + β2Big4 + β3LTA + β4LEV + β5BTM +ɛt…………………..(II) 
4. Results And Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Classic Assumption Test 
Before running the regression analysis, the assumption of normality of data was tested. 
Table 3 depicts the descriptive statistics of the data. All the variables except Big4 had 
values between .000 and .783 and .312 and -1.014, which indicated no problems of 
skewness or kurtosis respectively. The normality of data was achieved after transforming 
the ROA, Qratio and BTM in line with studies of Jusoh, Ahmad, and Omar (2013) and 
Coakes, Steed, and Ong (2009). The other variables did not require transformation. The 
transformation of the data was a two-step process, firstly requiring ranking of the 
selected variable data set using a fractional rank and secondly, using the fractional rank to 
compute the normalised variable (Templeton, 2011). Due to abnormality of Big 4, it was 
dropped from the models and thus was not considered in further analysis.  
After transformation, the histogram of standardised residuals indicated that the data 
contained approximately normally distributed errors, as did the normal P-P plot of 
standardised residuals, which showed points that were not completely on the line, but 
close. 
An analysis of standard residuals was carried out, which showed that the data contained 
no outliers (Std. Residual Min = -2.895, Std. Residual Max = 2.124). Tests to see if the data 
met the assumption of collinearity indicated that multicollinearity was not a concern 
(LAuditFees, Tolerance = .165, VIF = 6.070; LEV, Tolerance = .792, VIF = 1.263; LTA, 
Tolerance = .151, VIF = 6.643; NormBTM, Tolerance = .498, VIF = 2.007). The data met th e 
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assumption of independent errors (Durbin-Watson value = 1.084 and 1.036) for each of 
the two models 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Big4 0 1 .80 -1.519 .312 
ROA -12.35 29.23 8.440 .000 -.294 
Tobin's Q -236.99 417.08 90.044 .000 -.294 
LEV .082 124.607 47.909 .257 -1.014 
BTM -236.65 558.04 160.696 .000 .440 
LAuditFees 11.40 20.75 15.239 .783 -.395 
LTA 18.47 29.32 22.668 .824 -.177 
Panel Data Regression Analysis 
Table 4 shows the correlation between the independent and control variables and the 
dependent variables NormROA and NormQratio. All correlations except between LEV and 
NormBTM are significant at the .01 level. LAuditFees shows a significant and negative 
correlation between the two dependent variables (-.781 and -.545 between NormQratio 
and NormROA, respectively). The other variables show correlations between .839 and -
.844. Of the control variables, NormBTM has the only positive correlation with the 
dependent variables. 
Table 4: Model Correlation Matrix 
 NormQratio NormROA LAuditFees LTA LEV NormBTM 
NormQratio 1      
NormROA 1 1     
LAuditFees -.781** -.545** 1    
LTA -.844** -.634** .909** 1   
LEV -.501** -.626** .307** .389** 1  
NormBTM .839** .443** -.675** -.670** -.090 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
A multiple regression was carried out to assess if audit fees (LAuditFees), firms size 
(LTA), BTM and leverage (LEV)are predictors of financial performance i.e. NormROA and 
NormQratio. Table 5 depicts the summary of the model regression analysis. It was found 
that LAuditFees, NormBTM, LEV, LTA explain a significant amount of the variance in the 
value of ROA (F (4, 113) = 40.783, p < .05, R2 = .591, R2Adjusted = .576). Results also 
revealed that LAuditFees, NormBTM, LEV, LTA explain a significant amount of the 
variance in the value of NormQratio (F (4, 114) = 390.264, p < .05, R2 = .932, R2Adjusted = 
.930). 
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Table 5:  Model Regression Summary 
Model R R2 
Adjusted 
R Std. Error  F df1:2 
 
P 
1 .769a .591 .576 5.48203 40.783  4:113 .000 
2 .965b .932 .930 35.15996 390.264 4:114 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), NormBTM, LEV, LAuditFees, LTA; Dependent Variable: 
NormROA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), NormBTM, LEV, LAuditFees, LTA; Dependent Variable: 
NormQratio 
 
A further analysis of the individual level predictors shows that LAuditFees did not 
significantly predict NormROA or NormQratio (β = .120, p = .420; β = .061, p = .314). 
However, all other variables, i.e. the control variables revealed to be significant predictors 
of performance for both NormROA and NormQratio. 
Based on the analysis of the data, H1, which stated that Auditor size is a significant 
determinant of firm performance can neither be confirmed nor rejected due to the data 
set violating assumptions of further parametric analysis. However, based on the results of 
the regression analysis, this study fails to reject the null hypothesis for H2, which stated 
that Audit fees are a significant determinant of firm performance.  
The results of this study mimic those of Elewa and El-Hadded (2019) and Tanko and 
Polycarp (2019) that also found an insignificant effect of audit quality on performance. 
Tanko and Polycarp (2019) attributed the insignificance of the audit quality to political 
connectedness of companies. The study found that companies that were politically 
connected performed better than those that were not and the quality of the audit did not 
matter. 
5. Conclusion 
This study sought to determine the impact of audit quality on the financial performance of 
companies listed on the Botswana and Uganda stock markets. Regression analysis was 
conducted on a five-year panel data for 27 companies in total. In order to measure audit 
quality, auditor size and audit fees were used as proxies while financial performance was 
proxied by Return on Assets and Tobin's Q.  Due to non-conformity of the auditor size data 
to tests of normality, the variable was dropped from the analysis, and therefore this study 
could not test the first hypothesis. The second hypothesis was rejected as the results 
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revealed that Audit fees were statistically non-significant as a predictor for measures of 
both the non-market and market measures of performance. 
Theoretical contributions of this study are with respect to empirical evidence from the 
stock markets of two African countries, precisely, evidence on the relationship between 
audit quality and firm performance. It was found that contrary to the overwhelming 
empirical studies on the matter, audit quality is not a significant predictor of financial 
performance and thus ineffective as a corporate governance mechanism. The findings of 
this study suggest that investors cannot rely on the performance of audits as an assurance 
mechanism. Policymakers should ensure that there is the enforcement of existing laws in 
cases were an auditing firm issues an unqualified audit opinion for companies that later 
collapse. Additionally, more emphasis can be placed on external mechanisms of 
governance, such as board composition and ownership structure. 
The main limitation of this study is due to its sample size; two countries with small capital 
markets were sampled, which resulted in the analysis of 27 companies with 120 data 
points. Though this did not undermine the veracity of the findings; still, future studies can 
sample larger data sets from different or additional Sub-Saharan capital markets. 
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